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CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Harold Cartwright, III (Cartwright) was 
convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), eight counts 
of first-degree CSC with a minor, two counts of second-degree CSC with a minor, 
one count of third-degree CSC, and sixteen counts of committing a lewd act on a
minor. Cartwright appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) 
ruling evidence of his suicide attempt was admissible to show consciousness of guilt; 
and (2) qualifying a witness and allowing her to testify as an expert in the field of 
"child sexual abuse dynamics." The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Cartwright, 
Op. No. 2015-UP-466 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 30, 2015). This Court granted 
Cartwright's petition for a writ of certiorari.  We affirm. 
I. Factual / Procedural History 
Cartwright married Melinda Lively (Lively) in 1987.  From that relationship,
the couple had three children, Daughter, Hoss Cartwright (Hoss), and Jamie 
Cartwright. After Cartwright's divorce from Lively in 1997, Cartwright married
Buffy Brown (Buffy) in 1999. Prior to marrying Cartwright, Buffy had two children,
Stepdaughter One and Stepdaughter Two. In 2011, an Aiken County grand jury 
indicted Cartwright for sexually abusing Daughter and Stepdaughters One and Two
between 1989 and 2011.
At the time of trial, Daughter was twenty-eight years old. Daughter recalled
that, in 1989 when she was four, Cartwright had her perform oral sex on him.  
Daughter testified further that, when she was five years old, she told Lively about
the abuse, but Lively refrained from contacting the police because Cartwright
threatened to kill Daughter, Lively, and himself. Lively recalled Daughter 
mentioning the abuse, and corroborated Daughter's recollection that Lively did not
contact law enforcement because she was also afraid of Cartwright. Additionally,
Daughter explained to the jury that, when she was six, Cartwright ejaculated in her 
mouth. Daughter stated she spoke with the South Carolina Department of Social 
Services (DSS) about the incident, but she recanted because Cartwright instructed 
her to tell DSS that the abuse never happened. Daughter maintained that Cartwright 
never had sexual intercourse with her, but the sexual abuse continued every year 
until 1995, when she was ten. Furthermore, in response to the State's question about 
bribes, Daughter testified Cartwright would give her money, take her places, and
buy her various items. 







   
   
 
 
    












   
 
   
                                        
 





Daughter as part of an ongoing investigation of the alleged abuse of Stepdaughters 
One and Two. At that time, Daughter gave a statement to investigators detailing the 
abuse, which she later recounted at trial. Additionally, on cross-examination, 
Daughter acknowledged that, from 1995 until 2011, she never mentioned the alleged 
sexual abuse because she was afraid of Cartwright.1
Stepdaughter One was twenty-one at the time of Cartwright's trial. She 
recalled that Cartwright began abusing her when she was nine. Thereafter, during 
the years of 2000 and 2001, Cartwright made Stepdaughter One perform oral sex on 
him multiple times a month. In July of 2001, Stepdaughter One disclosed the abuse
to Sandra Parsons, a neighbor, and Michelle Prince, an Aiken County DSS 
employee. As a result, Cartwright was arrested in September of 2001 and released 
on bond. However, Stepdaughter One's mother, Buffy, convinced her to tell the 
prosecutors the abuse did not happen. Stepdaughter One explained that, after she
recanted, Cartwright returned to the home and the abuse continued in the form of 
"humping."   
Stepdaughter One further testified that, in 2002 when she was eleven, 
Cartwright began going into her room, rubbing his penis on her leg, and ejaculating 
on and in between her legs, "three to seven times a week." The abuse continued until 
2006 when Stepdaughter One was fifteen. During this time, Cartwright threatened 
her with a knife and she eventually agreed to have sexual intercourse with him in
exchange for money so she could visit an amusement park. Stepdaughter One 
maintained Cartwright would bribe her in the form of clothes, food, and 
transportation. According to Stepdaughter One, Cartwright threatened to kill her,
Buffy, Stepdaughter Two, and himself. 
Stepdaughter Two was eighteen at the time of Cartwright's trial.  She alleged
that Cartwright began sexually abusing her in 2008, when she was thirteen. She 
stated he would come into her room before school multiple times a week and hump 
her leg. Stepdaughter Two explained he would ejaculate on her, on her bed, and on 
1 Daughter also stated her husband, Kevin Autry (Kevin), was convicted in 2000 for 
second-degree CSC with a minor in which she was the victim. Cartwright's trial
counsel suggested Cartwright pushed the prosecution of Kevin. In response, 




























   
   
 
her clothes. According to Stepdaughter Two, Cartwright threatened "to kill all of us 
and himself."  
Stepdaughter Two testified that, when she was fourteen, Cartwright began 
having non-consensual sex with her. She recounted that, in May of 2010, after Hoss 
moved in, Cartwright stopped having sex with her, but continued to hump her before
school. Hoss recalled that every morning he would hear Cartwright enter 
Stepdaughter Two's bedroom and stay for an extended period of time. 
Investigators questioned Stepdaughter Two about the alleged sexual abuse.  
She initially told them Cartwright had not touched her because she was afraid of him 
but, after further questioning, she told the investigators Cartwright molested her.  
Buffy testified that Cartwright would spend ten to twenty minutes waking up 
Stepdaughter One each morning before school. Buffy admitted that she put "some
pressure" on Stepdaughter One to recant when Stepdaughter One originally reported 
the abuse because Cartwright convinced Buffy that he had done nothing wrong.  
Buffy acknowledged that on February 19, 2011, Cartwright revealed to her 
that he may have molested both stepdaughters. Thereafter, Buffy explained 
Cartwright instructed her to wash Stepdaughter Two's bed linens and underwear 
because he had been laying in the bed with Stepdaughter Two and his DNA was in
the bed. However, Buffy declined to wash the linens and consented to police 
searching the house and seizing the linens on February 25, 2011.  The DNA
recovered from Stepdaughter Two's bed sheet was a 1 in 16 trillion match to 
Cartwright's DNA. 
As part of its case, the State called Dr. Alicia Benedetto, a clinical 
psychologist, as an expert in "child sexual abuse dynamics." Over defense counsel's
objection, the trial court qualified Dr. Benedetto as an expert in clinical psychology.  
Dr. Benedetto acknowledged that she had not talked to any witnesses or victims in 
the case. She explained that "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" 
involved patterns of behavior that children engage in that may not make sense to 
adults. She stated that children often respond to sexual abuse in a different manner 
than adults. She acknowledged that a child's response, although different from an 
adult's, is not necessarily indicative of abuse or untruthfulness. She explained that, 




   
  




















   
    
 
    
gifts for the abused children. Dr. Benedetto asserted that manipulation and fear also 
play roles in maintaining secrecy. Specifically, she testified "[children] may be 
afraid for their own safety or the safety of siblings or the safety of the other parent 
in the home." Additionally, she noted that sexual abuse may cause children to "act 
out" and abuse alcohol or drugs. 
When asked about recantations, Dr. Benedetto maintained that "children 
routinely delay reporting" and any delay was not indicative of whether or not sexual 
abuse occurred. Dr. Benedetto added "[c]ertainly we're open to the possibility that 
it is a true recantation, but we also know that many times a child recants because of
what happens after they tell.  And, so, we want to be sure not to miss those cases."   
At the conclusion of the State's case, James Hettich, an Aiken County 
Detention Center guard, was offered to establish that Cartwright attempted to 
commit suicide while detained prior to trial. On April 13, 2011, Hettich found 
Cartwright hanging from his bunk with a sheet wrapped tightly around his neck.  
Hettich recalled that Cartwright was unresponsive, but still breathing. 
Cartwright took the stand in his own defense. He denied molesting any of the 
children and claimed that the semen found on Stepdaughter Two's sheets came from 
Buffy pushing him onto Stepdaughter Two's bed and masturbating him with 
underwear. 
Cartwright offered the following explanation as to why he attempted suicide: 
I turned myself in. I'd been there for 30 days. I couldn't get a bond. I
was charged with some of the most heinous crimes that somebody could 
ever think about being charged with. . . . I'm in my cell with all these 
things on my mind, and then the daughter that I loved, [Daughter], hates 
me so much because I had her husband . . . locked up . . . and she held 
a grudge against me, and they come [sic] and served me ten warrants. . 
. . [A]t that time I didn't feel I wanted to live any more [sic].
Ultimately, the jury found Cartwright guilty of all charges. The trial court
sentenced him to concurrent terms of thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree CSC
and each first-degree CSC with a minor, twenty years' imprisonment for each 






























a minor, and a consecutive term of ten years' imprisonment for third-degree CSC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
II. Standard of Review 
"The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a
manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice." State v. Douglas, 
369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847–48 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs 
when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are 
controlled by an error of law."  Id. at 429–30, 632 S.E.2d at 848.  
III. Discussion 
A. Attempted Suicide as Evidence of Guilt 
1. Arguments 
On appeal, Cartwright argues the Court of Appeals erred by finding the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion admitting evidence, including photographs, that 
Cartwright attempted to commit suicide while incarcerated. Cartwright maintains 
this evidence was irrelevant and, even if relevant, its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its unduly prejudicial effect under Rule 403, of the 
South Carolina Rules of Evidence. 
In regards to relevance, Cartwright asserts the State failed to establish a nexus 
between the suicide attempt and the charges against him. Cartwright maintains the 
nexus should involve much more than the defendant merely understanding he has 
been charged with committing a crime. While acknowledging he was aware of the
charges, Cartwright asserts that, because he turned himself in, his subsequent
attempted suicide cannot be viewed as relevant evidence of guilt and, therefore, 
admissible. Furthermore, Cartwright contends suicide is a complex act that, in his 
case, was caused by not being able to make bond and, as Cartwright maintains, the 










    
 
 
   
















   
"Evidence is relevant if it has a direct bearing upon and tends to establish or 
make more or less probable the matter in controversy." Rule 401, SCRE; State v. 
Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991). "All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided . . . ." Rule 402, SCRE; State v. Langley, 
334 S.C. 643, 515 S.E.2d 98 (1999). "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  
Rule 403, SCRE. "The determination of the prejudicial effect of the evidence must
be based on the entire record and the result will generally turn on the facts of each 
case." State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 609, 646 S.E.2d 872, 876 (2007). "Evidence 
is unfairly prejudicial if it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis, such as an emotional one." State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 7, 545 S.E.2d 
827, 830 (2001). 
This Court has not addressed whether evidence of an attempted suicide is 
admissible as evidence of guilt. However, the Court of Appeals has held evidence 
of a suicide attempt is probative of a defendant's consciousness of guilt, so long as 
the circumstances justify an inference that the defendant's suicide attempt was 
motivated by his belief that he was being sought by authorities for the offense for
which he is on trial. State v. Orozco, 392 S.C. 212, 708 S.E.2d 227 (Ct. App. 2011), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016) 
(overruling prior cases to the extent the holdings condoned the use of a jury 
instruction the Court deemed an impermissible charge on the facts). The court 
further held evidence of a suicide attempt is "generally admissible for whatever value 
the jury decides to give it." Id. at 220, 708 S.E.2d at 231. In so holding, the Court 
of Appeals reasoned that "[a suicide attempt] is easily analogized to other types of 
circumstantial evidence of guilt based on the accused's behavior after the crime."
Orozco, 392 S.C. at 218, 708 S.E.2d at 230; see State v. Edwards, 383 S.C. 66, 72, 
678 S.E.2d 405, 408 (2009) (holding witness intimidation evidence, if linked to the 
defendant, may be admitted to show a consciousness of guilt). We find the Orozco
framework does not provide adequate safeguards, for suicide-attempt evidence is 
fraught with the potential for extreme prejudice. Because the admission of such 
evidence should be approached with the utmost caution, we decline to follow 
Orozco. 
Evidence of attempted suicide is not easily analogized to evidence of guilt.  
Because this Court has not addressed whether evidence of an attempted suicide by a 









   
  












    







that evidence of attempted suicide may be admitted, provided that the State
establishes a clear and unmistakable nexus linking the suicide attempt to a guilty 
conscience derivative of the offense for which the defendant is on trial. We found a 
New Jersey case, State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1107 (N.J. 1993), instructive insofar 
as the admissibility of such evidence is concerned.  
In Mann, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined evidence of attempted
suicide is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, but requires the trial court to 
hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to evaluate whether evidence of the 
suicide attempt supports an inference that the defendant was seeking to avoid 
prosecution. Id. at 1108. The Mann court recognized that humans commit, and 
attempt to commit, suicide for a myriad of reasons including, but not limited to, 
prison conditions, family issues, financial problems, mental illness, emotional 
instability, disbelief in the justice system, stress, failure, and embarrassment. Id.
Acknowledging the complex nature of the evidence, the Mann court instructed trial
courts to consider defendants' alternative explanations, as well as the possible 
prejudice to a defendant from the introduction of the attempted suicide evidence. 
Additionally, the court noted trial courts "should ensure that a defendant has been 
given adequate notice of the State's intention to offer proof of the attempted suicide."  
Id.
 Persuaded by the guidelines set forth in Mann, we decline to adopt a per se 
rule either admitting or excluding this evidence. Instead, we find its admission 
should be made on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, we specifically depart from
Mann's requirement of jury instructions when suicide evidence is admitted.   
Accordingly, in future cases, we instruct trial courts to conduct a hearing
outside of the presence of the jury. During this hearing, at which the State and the 
defendant shall be permitted to introduce evidence, the trial court shall determine 
whether the State has proven that: (1) a jury could reasonably find that a suicide 
attempt occurred; (2) the defendant was aware of the occurrence of the alleged
crimes at the time of the suicide attempt; and (3) an unmistakable nexus exists by 
clear and convincing evidence linking the suicide attempt to a guilty conscience 
derivative of the offense for which the defendant is on trial. If the trial court 
concludes that the three factors have been established, the evidence is relevant and
may be admitted, subject to a Rule 403, SCRE analysis. The suicide-attempt















   
   
 
  
    
 









   







evidence survives a Rule 403 analysis. We recognize that in view of our rigorous
framework, suicide-attempt evidence will rarely be admitted.   
While this case presents a close question, we find the facts here survive the 
strict test for admissibility, including the trial court's Rule 403 determination that the 
probative value of the suicide-attempt evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. Prison authorities found Cartwright hanging in his 
cell, the same day Cartwright was served with additional warrants. Cartwright 
admitted that he attempted suicide after he became aware of the new charges. The 
record further reflects Cartwright threatened to commit suicide if the victims 
(Daughter, Stepdaughter One, and Stepdaughter Two) told anyone about the sexual 
abuse. The fact that Cartwright acted on his threat and attempted suicide enhances
the probative value of the evidence. Therefore, we hold evidence of Cartwright's
suicide attempt was relevant and properly admitted.2
The final issue regarding suicide-attempt evidence is whether the trial court 
should charge the jury on such evidence. We have carefully canvassed the law in 
other jurisdictions, and we conclude the trial court shall not provide a limiting
instruction or otherwise comment to the jury on this evidence. See S.C. Const. art.
V, § 21 ("Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare 
the law."). The absence of a jury instruction shall in no manner foreclose the ability 
of the State and the defendant to make permissible jury arguments3 respecting the 
jury's consideration of the suicide-attempt evidence.  
B. Expertise and Bolstering 
1. Arguments 
Cartwright asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
decision to qualify Dr. Alicia Benedetto as an expert in "child sexual abuse 
dynamics" where she acknowledged her job was to conduct interviews and not
conduct research or studies. Cartwright argues that, ultimately, Dr. Benedetto is a
2 Likewise, Cartwright's complaint of undue prejudice from the admission of two 
photographs of his prison cell is meritless.  
3 We do not suggest there are no limits to a party's jury argument, for the law 








   










   
 
    
 






   
 
forensic interviewer giving the same testimony as a witness qualified in that area.  
Therefore, Cartwright maintains the trial court abused its discretion by qualifying 
Dr. Benedetto as an expert in "child sexual abuse dynamics" to render opinion 
testimony under Rule 702, SCRE.  
2. Analysis 
To be admissible, the trial court must first determine whether the expert 
testimony satisfies Rule 702, SCRE. Rule 702 provides: "[i]f scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise." Additionally, if the expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702,
SCRE, the trial court must determine if its probative value is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999). 
Because child abuse assessment testimony is non-scientific, the trial court
must determine whether:  (1) the qualifications of the expert are sufficient; and (2) 
the expert's testimony will be reliable. State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 106–07, 771 
S.E.2d 336, 339 (2015). "There is no formulaic approach for determining the 
foundational requirements of qualifications and reliability in non-scientific 
evidence." Id. at 108, 771 S.E.2d at 339. "However, evidence of mere procedural 
consistency does not ensure reliability without some evidence demonstrating that the 
individual expert is able to draw reliable results from the procedures of which he or 
she consistently applies."  Id. 
Over defendant's objection, the trial court qualified Dr. Benedetto as an expert
in clinical psychology and, citing State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 523 S.E.2d 787 
(Ct. App. 1999),4 allowed Dr. Benedetto "to render opinions on sexual abuse 
4 In Weaverling, the Court of Appeals determined "[e]xpert testimony concerning 
common behavioral characteristics of sexual assault victims" is not only relevant, 
but also "helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent 
victims."  337 S.C. at 474-75, 523 S.E.2d at 794.  Additionally, the court concluded 
"[t]here is no requirement the sexual assault victim be personally interviewed by the 




































Dr. Benedetto graduated with a B.A. in psychology from New York
University, and a Masters and Ph.D. from St. John's University.  She completed her 
internship at William S. Hall Psychiatric Institute. Dr. Benedetto stated she was a 
licensed clinical psychologist and was the chief psychologist, for eleven years, at the 
Assessment and Resource Center (ARC), a children's advocacy center under the 
South Carolina Department of Mental Health. In that capacity, Dr. Benedetto 
explained "at the ARC, I conduct forensic interviews on a daily basis."  Although
Dr. Benedetto acknowledged there are many empirical studies on how children 
respond to abuse, she maintained that she was not a researcher, but instead a
clinician. 
While Dr. Benedetto's background and daily job duties consisted of
conducting forensic interviews, the admission of which this Court cautioned against
in State v. Kromah,5 Dr. Benedetto's education, formal training, and significant 
contact with sexually abused children qualified her to give an opinion on the 
behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children. See State v. Jones, 417 S.C.
319, 790 S.E.2d 17 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding expert's testimony on "child sex[ual]
abuse dynamics" properly admitted by trial court because the testimony was reliable 
and the subject was beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury); State v. Barrett, 
416 S.C. 124, 785 S.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 2016) (finding no error in the trial court
qualifying victim's forensic interviewer as an expert mental health professional in 
the area of child sexual abuse characteristics where the expert was a licensed 
professional counselor with a master's degree in clinical psychology). Therefore, we 
find the trial court did not err in qualifying Dr. Benedetto as an expert in "child 
sexual abuse dynamics." 
Even if Dr. Benedetto was properly qualified as an expert, Cartwright
contends her testimony was highly prejudicial. Cartwright maintains that, because
Dr. Benedetto's testimony mirrored the claims in his case, her testimony was the 
equivalent of improper bolstering by a forensic interviewer. Cartwright's contention 
5 401 S.C. at 357 n.5, 737 S.E.2d at 499 n.5 (stating "we can envision no 


































is meritless. Cartwright ignores the fact that Dr. Benedetto is not the typical forensic 
interviewer. Dr. Benedetto has advanced educational degrees in psychology and has 
formally studied human behavior. 
Cartwright is correct that "[w]hile experts may give an opinion, they are not
permitted to offer an opinion as to the credibility of others." State v. Chavis, 412 
S.C. 101, 109, 771 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2015). "'Specifically, it is improper for a 
witness to testify as to his or her opinion about the credibility of a child victim in a
sexual abuse matter.'" Id. (quoting Kromah, 401 S.C. at 358-59, 737 S.E.2d at 500 
(cautioning forensic interviewers to avoid "any statement that indirectly vouches for 
the child's believability")); see State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 
94 (2011) (finding error where there was "no other way to interpret the language 
used in the reports other than to mean the forensic interviewer believed the children 
were being truthful"). Further, "[i]t is axiomatic that the credibility of the testimony 
of these witnesses is for the jury." State v. Wright, 269 S.C. 414, 417, 237 S.E.2d 
764, 766 (1977). 
We find Dr. Benedetto's testimony did not improperly bolster the victims'
credibility. Rather, her testimony served the purpose of explaining the behaviors 
common to sexually abused children. Here, she never interviewed the victims and
never stated she believed the victims were telling the truth. Dr. Benedetto simply
described, in general terms, the reasons why children recant. Additionally, Dr. 
Benedetto explained that abusers often bought gifts for victims, that victims are often
threatened about disclosure of the abuse, and that victims may start to act out and 
begin drinking or using drugs. Thus, although Dr. Benedetto's testimony 
corroborated some of the minor victims' general behavior, she properly testified in
broad terms based on her expert qualifications. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined Dr. Benedetto's testimony did not result in improper vouching 
for the credibility of the victims. 
IV. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we: (1) affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals 
holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion admitting evidence of the
attempted suicide; (2) set forth the framework trial courts must apply in future cases 
when evidence of a suicide attempt is offered to prove consciousness of guilt; (3) 












Dr. Benedetto as an expert in clinical psychology and allowed her to render an 
opinion on "child sexual abuse dynamics"; and (4) affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals determining Dr. Benedetto's testimony did not constitute improper 
bolstering. 
 AFFIRMED.
KITTREDGE and JAMES, JJ., concur.  HEARN, J., concurring in a 




   






    




    












    
JUSTICE HEARN: I write separately to express my view that evidence of a suicide 
attempt, standing alone, is not probative of guilt and should not be admitted into 
evidence. However, because I believe any error in admitting Cartwright's suicide 
attempt in this case was harmless, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Like the majority, I disagree with the court of appeals that a suicide attempt 
is easily analogized to other types of circumstantial evidence of guilt. See State v.
Onorato, 762 A.2d 858, 859–60 (Vt. 2000) ("The underlying reasons motivating an
attempt to take one's life can be both numerous and highly complex, and may be 
even less indicative of guilt than flight evidence."). I do not, for example, find 
evidence of a suicide attempt similar to evidence of flight or witness intimidation or 
other incriminating behavior following the commission of a crime.  In my view, a
suicide attempt without some tangible inculpatory evidence––such as a note penned 
in the defendant's hand which states that his suicide was motivated by guilt stemming
from his commission of the crime––should never be admitted. See Stephenson v. 
State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 120 (Ind. 2015) ("We decline to find that the mere existence 
of an attempted suicide, without more, is relevant evidence of a person's guilty 
conscience about committing a charged crime, . . . ."). While I disagree with the 
result ultimately reached by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Mann, 625 
A.2d 1102 (N.J. 1993), it recognized that the reasons people commit suicide and 
attempt to commit suicide are diverse and complex. A panoply of mental and 
emotional health issues factor into a person's decision to take his or her own life and 
without clear corroboration that the attempt was motivated by guilt, such evidence 
is simply too speculative in my view to be admissible in a criminal trial. Even prior 
to the turn of the twentieth century, courts recognized suicide and attempts to commit 
suicide may be brought about by numerous factors, including prison conditions, 
family issues, financial problems, mental illness, emotional instability, lack of
confidence in the justice system, stress, failure, and embarrassment––all factors that
can weigh heavily on the minds of the guilty and not guilty alike. See State v.
Coudotte, 72 N.W. 913, 916 (N.D. 1897) ("When we essay the task of accounting 
for suicide on any general grounds, we undertake a task that, from its very nature, is 
impossible of performance. The human mind is so wonderfully, yet so delicately, 
constructed, the human passions are so powerful, yet so varied, that it is idle for any 
one person to pretend to enter the consciousness of another, and account for the inner 
workings of that other mind."). Absent tangible evidence that connects the suicide 
attempt to consciousness of guilt, I do not believe a defendant's actions in trying to 











Nonetheless, in this case, there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt apart from his suicide attempt, including DNA evidence recovered from 
Stepdaughter Two's bed sheets. Accordingly, although I would find error in the
admission of Cartwright's suicide attempt into evidence, I would deem it harmless 
and affirm his conviction.










The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Hoyt Shay Neal, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2018-000223
ORDER 
On February 8, 2018, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel forwarded to this Court 
an order of the Arizona Supreme Court, dated July 17, 2017, suspending 
respondent for two years from the practice of law in Arizona, retroactive to June 
13, 2017, the date respondent was suspended for failure to pay bar dues, followed 
by probation for two years. Thereafter, pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR, the Clerk of Court sent a 
letter to respondent, which included a copy of the disciplinary action, giving him 
thirty days to inform this Court of any claim that imposition of the identical 
discipline in South Carolina was not warranted and the reasons for any such claim.  
See Rule 29(b), RLDE ("Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating 
that a lawyer admitted to practice in this state has been disciplined or transferred to 
incapacity inactive status in another jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall issue a 
notice to the lawyer … [d]irecting that the lawyer … inform the Supreme Court, 
within 30 days from service of the notice, of any claim … that the imposition of 
the identical discipline or transfer to incapacity inactive status in this state would 
be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim." (emphasis added)).  Respondent 
did not respond. Accordingly, the Court places respondent on interim suspension 
pursuant to Rule 17(c), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR (a lawyer who fails to respond to 
inquiries from the Supreme Court may be placed on interim suspension). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until he responds to the Clerk's letter of April 11, 2018. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
FOR THE COURT 
Columbia, South Carolina 























The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Daniel Edward Johnson, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2018-001711 
ORDER 
Respondent was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on twenty-six counts of wire 
fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy, and theft of federal funds.  In addition, respondent 
was indicted by a State Grand Jury on three counts of misconduct in office and 
embezzlement of public funds.  The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court 
to place respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  Respondent acknowledges his federal 
and state indictments and consents to an interim suspension.
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty C.J. 
FOR THE COURT 
Columbia, South Carolina 


















The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Re: Amendments to Rule 408(b)(1), South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules 
Appellate Case No. 2018-000588 
ORDER 
The Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization (CLE 
Commission) has proposed amending Rule 408(b)(1) of the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules to alter the process of nominating attorney members of the 
CLE Commission.  We adopt the CLE Commission's proposed amendments, with
some modifications.            
Pursuant to Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 408(b)(1) 
of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules is amended, effective immediately, to 
provide as follows:
(b) Commission on Continuing Legal Education and 
Specialization.
(1) Membership and Terms of Office. The Commission on 
Continuing Legal Education and Specialization shall consist of 
twelve (12) members. The Supreme Court shall appoint to the 
Commission: one (1) member of the Supreme Court or Court of 
Appeals; one (1) circuit court judge; one (1) family court judge; 
two (2) attorneys from each of the four (4) judicial regions 
established by order of the Chief Justice dated January 9, 1992; 
and one (1) additional attorney from Region II. Of the members 
first appointed to the Commission, four (4) shall serve a term of 
one (1) year; four (4) shall serve a term of two (2) years; and
four (4) shall serve a term of three (3) years. Members 
thereafter appointed shall be appointed for three (3) years, but 
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shall continue to serve until their successors are appointed. A 
member appointed to fill an unexpired term shall serve only to 
the completion of that term and until his or her successor is 
appointed. The Commission shall nominate up to two (2) 
members of the South Carolina Bar to fill each attorney 
position on the Commission and forward the name(s) of the 
nominee(s) to the South Carolina Bar's Board of Governor's for 
review. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the name(s) of the 
nominee(s), the Board of Governors shall submit a written 
recommendation to the Supreme Court concerning the 
appointment. No person shall be appointed for more than two 
(2) consecutive terms. The Supreme Court shall appoint a 




s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
s/ George C. James, Jr.  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 




























The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Re: Amendments to Rule 607(h)(1), South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules 
Appellate Case No. 2018-001575 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 607(h)(1) 
of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules is amended as set forth in the 
attachment to this Order.  The amendments increase the various fees Judicial 
Department Court Reporters shall receive for transcription and other services.   
The increased fees set forth in paragraph (h)(1) shall apply to all requests for 
transcription and other services made on or after October 15, 2018.
s/ Donald W. Beatty C.J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
s/ George C. James, Jr. J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 



















Rule 607(h)(1) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules is amended to 
provide: 
(h) Fees for Transcription and Other Services. 
(1) By Judicial Department Court Reporter. A court reporter shall 
receive the following fees:
(A) A fee of Four Dollars and Twenty-Five Cents ($4.25) per 
page for producing an original transcript.
(B) A fee of One Dollar ($1.00) per page for furnishing a copy 
of a previously prepared transcript. 
(C) A fee of Two Dollars ($2.00) per page for each person 
receiving Real-time output when a Real-time Request is signed 
by the requestor. 
(D) A fee of One Dollar and Fifty Cents ($1.50) per page for 
unedited (rough copy) ASCII Disks when no request for an 
original transcript has been made. 
(E) A fee of Thirty-Five Dollars ($35) for edited ASCII disks. 
This service is only available to a requestor who has requested
an original or a copy of the transcript. 
(F) A fee of One Dollar and Fifty Cents ($1.50) per page for 
condensed transcripts, which contain no more than four pages 
of text. This service is only available to a requestor who has 
requested an original or a copy of the transcript. 
(G) A fee of One Dollar ($1.00) per page for Keyword 
Indexing. This service is only available to a requestor who has
requested an original or a copy of the transcript. 
(H) A fee of Forty Dollars ($40) for e-mailed transcripts. This 
service is only available to a requestor who has requested an 











(I) A fee of Two Dollars ($2.00) per page for unedited (rough 
draft) e-mailed transcripts. 
(J) The following per page costs apply to requests to produce a 
transcript on an expedited basis: 
(i) A fee of Five Dollars ($5.00) for original transcripts 
delivered within seven days of the request and One 
Dollar ($1.00) for a copy. 
(ii) A fee of Six Dollars ($6.00) for original transcripts 
delivered overnight and One Dollar and Twenty-Five 
Cents ($1.25) for a copy.
(iii) A fee of Seven Dollars ($7.00) for original 
transcripts delivered on a daily basis and One Dollar and 
Twenty-Five Cents ($1.25) for a copy. 
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